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Abstract
As any technology aimed to provide a security service, biometric systems are exposed to
external attacks which could compromise their integrity. Thus, it is of special relevance to
understand the threats to which they are subjected and to analyse their vulnerabilities in order
to prevent possible attacks and increase their benefits for the users. This line of thought has
encouraged some research studies in the last decade, as well as common projects in the European
Union, which involve universities as well as private companies.
In this work, a new multimodal indirect attack has been proposed and its impact on the
security offered by biometric systems studied. First, new indirect attacks based on hill-climbing
algorithms to unimodal systems have been proposed. Their performance has been thoroughly
analysed on systems based on face and iris, and compared to existing state-of-the-art algorithms.
The performance of the multimodal attack has been also compared to the performance of the
unimodal sub-algorithms.
During all the experiments, a rigorous and completely reproducible protocol has been fol-
lowed. This allows us to establish a fair comparison between the attacking schemes proposed,
regardless of the biometric system attacked. Furthermore, future studies, possibly carried out
by other researchers, can follow the same protocol (also described in the present work) and their
findings can be compared to ours.
The results show to what extent the proposed techniques affect the security offered by the
biometric systems tested, and the necessity of new measures to counterfeit these types of threats.
Some countermeasures have been also tested: score quantization has been applied to the face-
based unimodal and the multimodal recognition systems, while for the iris-based system the use
of the most consistent bits of the iriscode has been considered. Even though the countermeasures
applied barely reduced the success chances of the unimodal sub-algorithms, in the case of the
multimodal attack, score quantization successfully prevents an eventual impostor from gaining
access to the system. 1
1Part of the work of this thesis has been published in Pattern Recognition Letters, and presented in the 5th
International Conference in Biometrics, in the 17th Iberoamerican Conference on Pattern Recognition and in
the European Workshop on Biometrics and Identity Management, BioID. The accepted papers are included in
Appendix A.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Automatic recognition of people is a challenging issue present in many fields, from au-
thentication in your own laptop to on-line bank transactions. In the last decades, biometrics
have emerged as an alternative to traditional PIN- or token-based security applications, offering
a reliable way of verifying the identity of a given subject. However, as with any other new
technology, a great effort, shared by all the biometrics community (i.e., researchers, vendors,
etc.), has to be done in order to improve the performance of the systems, reduce the impact
of external attacks, and increase the trust of the final user. This work tries to shed some light
into the area, and encourage future studies that may help the introduction of biometrics into
everyday life.
In this Chapter biometrics are introduced in Sect. 1.1, and several aspects, closely related
to the topic at hand, are described: in Sect. 1.2, multibiometrics are presented and Sect 1.3
describes the complex problem of security evaluation in biometrics. Finally, the objectives of
this work are presented in Sect. 1.4 and an outline of the Dissertation is included in Sect. 1.5.
1.1. Biometric Systems
“A biometric system measures one or more physical or behavioural characteristics [...] of
an individual to determine or verify his identity” [Jain et al., 2011]. Biometric systems can
be therefore regarded as an specific application of pattern recognition algorithms. Instead of
asking what you posses or what you know, these systems base their decisions on who you are or
what you produce. On the one hand, who you are refers to physiological characteristics such as
fingerprints, iris, or face. On the other hand, what you produce refers to behavioral patterns
which entail a learning process and that characterise your identity such as the voice or the
written signature.
This new paradigm proposed by biometrics not only provides enhanced security but also
avoids, in authentication applications, the need to remember multiple passwords and maintain
multiple authentication tokens.
1
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Figure 1.1: Diagrams of the typical modes of operation in a biometric system.
In order to process the information comprised in biometric traits, their characteristics or fea-
tures have to be extracted and transformed into the digital domain. This digital representation
is known as template. In Fig. 1.1 (top), the enrolment or training process by which templates
are stored in the system is depicted. Once the users have been enrolled to the system, the
recognition process can be performed in two modes [Jain et al., 2006]:
Identification. In this mode, a one-to-many comparison must be performed in order to
answer the question “is this person in the database?”. The answer might thus be Aˆ‘NoAˆ’
(the person is unknown to the system), or any of the registered identities in the database
(Fig. 1.1, center).
Verification. In this case, a one-to-one comparison must be carried out: we want to know
is if a person is really who she claims to be (i.e., is this person truly John Doe?). The
system compares the biometric trait to the enrolled pattern associated with the claimed
identity (Fig. 1.1, bottom), in order to determine if the subject is a client (the identity
claim is accepted), or an impostor (the identity claim is rejected). Typical verification
applications include network logon, ATMs, physical access control, credit-card purchases,
etc.
This Dissertation is focused on the security evaluation of biometric systems working under
the verification mode (also known as authentication). In this mode, the clients or targets are
2
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Figure 1.2: Examples of common biometrics.
known to the system (through the enrolment process), whereas the impostors can potentially
be the world population. The result of the comparison between the feature vector X (extracted
from the biometric sample B provided by the user) and the template TI corresponding to his/her
claimed identity I is a similarity score s which is compared to a decision threshold. If the score
is higher than the decision threshold, then the claim is accepted (client), otherwise the claim is
rejected (impostor).
In order to perform the user authentication, a number of different biometrics have been pro-
posed and are used in various applications [Jain et al., 2006]. The above mentioned classification
into physical and psychological traits is just indicative, as some of them are not easy to cate-
gorize in any of the groups. The voice, for instance, is commonly accepted to be a behavioural
biometric (as the voice is something that we learn to produce), however its distinctiveness largely
depends on physiological characteristics (e.g., vocal tracts, mouth, nasal cavities, or lips). On
the other hand, other very distinctive human feature, the DNA, is usually not considered a
biometric modality as recognition systems based on it still require manual operation and cannot
be used in (pseudo) real-time. Example images from various biometrics are given in Fig. 1.2.
In theory, any human characteristic can be used as a biometric identifier as long as it satisfies
the following requirements:
Universality, which indicates to what extent a biometric is present in the world popula-
tion.
Distinctiveness, which means that two persons should have sufficiently different biomet-
3
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rics.
Permanence, which indicates that the biometric should have a compact representation
invariant over a sufficiently large period of time.
Collectability, which refers to the easiness of the acquisition process and to the ability
to measure the biometric quantitatively.
Other criteria required for practical applications include:
Performance, which refers to the efficiency, accuracy, speed, robustness and resource
requirements of particular implementations based on the biometric.
Acceptability, which refers to which people are willing to use the biometric and in which
terms.
Circumvention, which reflects the difficulty to fool a system based on a given biometric
by fraudulent methods.
Exception handling, which has to do with the possibility to complete a manual matching
process for those people that cannot interact in a normal way with the system (e.g.,
impossibility to perform the feature extraction process due to an excessive degradation of
the trait).
Cost, which refers to all the costs that would be necessary to introduce the system in a
real-world scenario.
1.2. Multibiometrics
An ideal biometric system should meet all the aforementioned requirements. Unfortunately,
no single biometric trait satisfies all of them: while some biometrics have a very high distinc-
tiveness (e.g., fingerprint or iris), they are relatively easy to circumvent (e.g., using a gummy
finger, or an iris printed photograph); similarly, other biometrics such as the face thermogram
or the vein pattern of the retina are very difficult to circumvent, but their distinctiveness is low
and are not easy to acquire. Multibiometrics, or the combination of several biometric sources,
have been considered as a possible solution to this problem: several sources usually compensate
for the inherent limitations of one another Jain et al. [2011].
Combining information from several biometric traits also increases the accuracy of the recog-
nition system, an essential requirement for many practical applications such as the US-VISIT
program and the Unique Identification (UID) system in India, where the identification of very
large numbers of subjects must be resolved with negligible error rates.
However, multibiometric systems not only include those based on several traits. According to
the multiple sources used, multibiometric systems can be broadly classified into: i) multi-sensor,
that is, several sensors are used in the acquisition stage; ii) multi-algorithm, that is, several
4
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representations of the trait are considered and processed; iii) multi-instance, for example, both
the right and the left eyes of the subject are considered; iv) multi-sample, that is, one sensor is
used to acquire multiple samples of the same trait; and v) multimodal systems, which combine
different biometric traits. Therefore, in the first four scenarios, only one biometric trait is used.
The information offered by several unimodal biometric systems can be fused at five different
levels, namely: i) sensor-level, ii) feature-level, iii) score-level, iv) rank-level, and v) decision-
level. While the first two options fuse the information prior to matching, the remaining fusion
approaches use the information available after matching: either a numeric score or a binary
decision (accept/reject). Even though fusion at an earlier processing stage should perform better
(the information available is richer), specific and more complex algorithms have to be applied.
The development of such algorithms is not straightforward, and therefore most multibiometric
systems use score- or decision-level approaches.
As well as increasing the performance of biometric recognition systems, multibiometrics have
usually been considered to increase the security of the systems for the final users. They have
also been regarded as more robust to external attacks: the vulnerabilities shown by one trait
can be compensated by the rest of the traits used.
However, in the last decade, some studies have questioned this common belief for spoofing
attacks [Akhtar and Alfarid, 2011; Akhtar et al., 2011; Chetty and Wagner, 2005; Johnson et al.,
2010; Rodrigues et al., 2010, 2009]. In most cases, attacking the most robust trait leads to success
in the global attack. The question of whether the same behaviour may be observed for indirect
attacks remains unanswered.
In the present Dissertation, we study for the first time the vulnerabilities of multimodal
biometric systems with score-level fusion to indirect software attacks.
1.3. Security Evaluation in Biometrics
A great deal of attention has been given recently to the key area where this work is focused:
evaluating the security of biometric systems. Many different researchers have addressed the vul-
nerabilities of biometric systems to spoofing attacks (those carried out at the sensor level using,
for instance, a gummy finger or a printed iris image) [Galbally et al., 2011; Matsumoto, 2004;
Rodrigues et al., 2009; Thalheim and Krissler, 2002], and to software-based attacks (carried out
against some of the internal modules of the system) [Galbally et al., 2010; Martinez-Diaz et al.,
2011; Uludag and Jain, 2004]. Furthermore, the interest in the analysis of system vulnerabilities
has permeated the scientific field and different standardization initiatives at the international
level have emerged in order to deal with the problem of security evaluation in biometric systems,
such as the Common Criteria [CC, 2006] and its associated Biometric Evaluation Methodology
[BEM, 2002] or the ISO/IEC-19792:2009 for biometric security evaluation [ISO/IEC 19792,
2009].
In addition to research works which address the vulnerabilities of multimodal systems to
spoofing attacks [Akhtar and Alfarid, 2011; Akhtar et al., 2011; Chetty and Wagner, 2005;
5
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Ha¨mmerle-Uhl et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 2010; Marasco, 2010; Rodrigues et al., 2010, 2009],
different studies may be found in the literature regarding the analysis of indirect attacks to
unimodal systems [Galbally et al., 2010; Martinez-Diaz et al., 2011; Uludag and Jain, 2004].
However, the problem of whether multimodal approaches are vulnerable or not to software-
based attacking methodologies, and if their level of protection against these threats is really
increased compared to unimodal schemes, still remains unexplored.
1.3.1. Transparency vs Obscurity
When addressing the problem of providing a security service, two main approaches may be
adopted to guarantee that the level of security offered to the user is not compromised: security
through obscurity (also security by obscurity) or security through transparency (also known as
security by design).
The security through obscurity principle relies on secrecy (of design, implementation, formats
and protocols used, etc.) to provide security. A system using this approach may have theoretical
or practical security vulnerabilities, but its designers believe that attackers are unlikely to find or
to exploit them. Developers supporting this methodology argue that if details of countermeasures
employed in biometric systems are publicized, it may help attackers to avoid or defeat them.
Similarly, if attackers know what countermeasures are not employed, this will help them to
identify potential weaknesses in the system, enabling the attacks towards those weak areas.
Furthermore, an attacker’s first step is usually information gathering; this step is delayed by
security through obscurity.
In opposition, the security through transparency scheme follows the Kerckhoffs’ principle
(stated by Auguste Kerckhoffs in the 19th century) [Kerckhoffs, 1883]: a cryptosystem should
be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge. Although
it was first thought for cryptography, the principle was later reformulated to be applied to any
security system as “the enemy knows the system”. Undoubtedly, any security system depends
on keeping some things secret, the question is, what things?. The Kerckhoffs’ principle points
out that the things which are kept secret ought to be those which are least costly to change
if inadvertently disclosed. In other words, the fewer and simpler the things one needs to keep
secret in order to ensure the security of the system, the easier it is to maintain that security.
Quoting B. Schneier, one of the world’s leading security technologists, “Kerckhoffs’ principle
applies beyond codes and ciphers to security systems in general: every secret creates a potential
failure point. Secrecy, in other words, is a prime cause of brittleness and therefore something
likely to make a system prone to catastrophic collapse. Conversely, openness provides ductility”
[Schneier, 2000].
Applying security through transparency to biometrics would mean, in words of the Biometric
Working Group [BWG, 2009]: “make public exposure of countermeasures and vulnerabilities
which will lead to a more mature and responsible attitude from the biometrics community and
promote the development of more secure systems in the future” [BWG, 2003].
Our view on biometric security, based on which this Dissertation has been developed, is
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aligned with the security through transparency principle. This way, throughout the Dissertation
different threats that may affect biometric systems are pointed out, systematically evaluated,
and new countermeasures that can guarantee the final level of security offered to the user are
proposed.
1.4. Motivation and Objectives
Certainly, biometrics are very attractive and useful for the final user: forget about PINs
and passwords, you are your own key Jain et al. [2006]; Wayman et al. [2005]. However, we
cannot forget that as any technology aimed to provide a security service, biometric systems are
exposed to external attacks which could compromise their integrity [Schneier, 1999]. Thus, it is
of special relevance to understand the threats to which they are subjected and to analyse their
vulnerabilities in order to prevent possible attacks and increase their benefits for the users.
Although several works have already studied different specific vulnerabilities of biometric
systems [Hennebert et al., 2007; Hill, 2001; Thalheim and Krissler, 2002], the problem has been
addressed on most cases from a yes-or-no perspective (i.e., the question being answered is, can a
biometric system be bypassed using this attacking method? ). However, in most of those valuable
research contributions, a far more complex question remains unanswered: how vulnerable is
the biometric system to the attack?. Identifying the threats is the first stage in a vulnerability
evaluation, however quantifying the danger is just as important in order to assess the security
level provided by the application.
The second observation is strongly related to the first one. In these existing publications,
experimental results are obtained and reported without following any general or systematic
protocol, and thus, even in the case of performing an statistical analysis of a given vulnerability,
results cannot be compared, losing this way part of their utility.
This new concern which has arisen in the biometric community regarding the security of
biometric systems has led to the appearance of several international projects, like the Euro-
pean Tabula Rasa [2010] and BEAT [2012], which base their research on the security through
transparency principle, which was already introduced in Sect. 1.3.1 [Kerckhoffs, 1883; Schneier,
2000]: in order to make biometric systems more secure and reliable, their vulnerabilities need
to be analysed and useful countermeasures need to be developed.
As well as those international projects, different initiatives are currently trying to develop
standard security evaluation protocols [BEM, 2002; CC, 2006; ISO/IEC 19792, 2009]. These
standards are in general directed to the very wide range of Information Technology security
products, which means that additional documents are required in order to apply the general
guidelines given in the norms to the particular specificities of a given technology. This is spe-
cially important in the biometric field due to the large amount of different existing biometric
modalities and the multiple areas of knowledge that it covers (pattern recognition, computer
vision, electronics, etc.)
Thus, following the same transparency principle, the main objectives and contributions of
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the present work are: i) proposal of a fully novel software-based attacking methodology against
multimodal systems, ii) study of the vulnerabilities of a realistic multimodal system to the
previous attack under a replicable scenario, iii) comparison of the performance of the multimodal
attack to that obtained against the unimodal modules in order to determine if the multimodal
approach increases the security of the system against this type of threat, and iv) study of some
biometric-based countermeasures which may prevent such attacks.
1.5. Outline of the Dissertation
The Dissertation is structured as follows:
Chapter 1 introduces the topic of biometrics and gives the motivation, outline and objec-
tives of this MSc. Thesis.
Chapter 2 summarizes the state of the art in biometric security, presenting related works.
Chapter 3 describes the methods proposed in the Dissertation.
Chapter 4 presents the experimental protocol followed in the experiments.
Chapter 5 describes the experiments carried out and analyses the results.
Chapter 6 concludes the Dissertation summarizing the main results obtained and outlining
future research lines.
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Chapter 2
Related Works and State of the Art
Biometrics is a wide field of research, where, as with any other new technology, many
aspects must be analysed. Many studies have been carried out in order to improve the recognition
performance or analyse the social acceptability, but in order to increase the trust of the final
user, other aspects should be carefully looked into. The level of security and privacy offered by
these systems are a key to the final expansion of this thriving technology.
Only the most closely related topics to the Dissertation within the biometrics field of research
are summarized in this Chapter. The main goal of the present work is to evaluate the vulnera-
bilities of a multimodal biometric system to an indirect attack. The general method proposed,
which may be applied to any multimodal system, is described in Chapter 3, and experiments
are carried out on a face and iris-based biometric system in Chapter 5.
This Chapter thus focuses on vulnerability evaluations to indirect attacks. In Sect. 2.1,
attacks to biometric recognition systems are presented and categorized, emphasizing indirect
attacks, more closely related to our work. Finally, in Sect. 2.2 and 2.3, brief summaries of face
and iris recognition, respectively, are presented.
2.1. Attacks to Biometric Recognition Systems
In 2001, Ratha et al. identified and classified in a biometric recognition system eight possible
points of attack [Ratha et al., 2001]. These vulnerable points, depicted in Fig. 2.1, can be broadly
divided into direct (first point) and indirect attacks (seven remaining points).
Direct attacks. Also known as spoofing-attacks, these are attacks at the sensor level, carried
out with synthetic biometric traits, such as gummy fingers or high quality printed iris images,
and thus requiring no knowledge for the attacker of the inner parts of the system (matching
algorithm used, feature extraction method, template format, etc.)
Some research regarding the vulnerabilities of multimodal systems to these attacks has been
carried out over the last recent years: in 2005, Chetty and Wagner [2005] tested the performance
of spoofing attacks against a novel multimodal system based on face and voice; in 2009, Tan
[2009] investigated methods for increasing the security of multimodal systems based on face
9
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Figure 2.1: Architecture of an automated biometric verification system. Possible attack points are
numbered from 1 to 8.
and voice against spoofing attacks; in 2010 [Rodrigues et al., 2010] and 2011 [Rodrigues et al.,
2009], Rodrigues et al. evaluated the vulnerabilities of a multimodal system based on face and
fingerprint, using different fusion techniques and proposing new ones more robust to the attacks;
in 2010, Johnson et al. [2010] analysed the effect of spoofing attacks against a multimodal system
based on face and iris, proposing a method for the vulnerabilities assessment of these systems;
later in 2010, Marasco [2010] analysed the security risk in multimodal biometric systems based
on face and fingerprint coming from spoofing attacks; in 2011, Akhar et al. [Akhtar and Alfarid,
2011; Akhtar et al., 2011] used real rather than simulated spoof samples for the evaluation of
the vulnerabilities of a multimodal system based on fingerprint, face and iris, proposing a new
learning algorithm able to improve the security offered by the system against spoofing attacks.
All these works have proven that combining several traits in one system for person authentication
does not necessarily increment the security offered against spoofing attacks, since the system
can be bypassed by breaking only one of the unimodal traits.
Indirect attacks. These attacks can be further divided in three groups, namely: i) attacks
2, 4, 7 and 8 lie in the communication channels of the system, extracting, adding or changing
information; ii) attacks 3 and 5 may be carried out using a Trojan Horse that bypasses the
feature extractor and the matcher, respectively; and iii) attack 6, in which the system database
may be manipulated in order to gain access to the application, by changing, adding or deleting a
template. While for direct attacks the intruder needed no knowledge about the inner modules of
the system, this knowledge is a main requisite here, together with access to some of the system
components (database, feature extractor, matcher, etc.).
Most of these indirect attacks are based on some variation of a hill-climbing algorithm. A
general hill-climbing approach starts by synthetically generating an initial pool of templates (see
Fig. 2.2 left). Each of them is used in an attempt to access the system. If none of them succeeds,
the templates are iteratively changed, according to a particular modification scheme, so that
at each iteration a higher similarity score between the synthetic and the attacked template is
obtained, until eventually access to the system is granted. A limit on the number of iterations
is usually established in order to avoid infinite loops. The main difference between hill-climbing
attacks is therefore the modification scheme.
In Fig. 2.2 (right), an example of the evolution of the scores across the iterations of a hill-
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Figure 2.2: Diagram of a generic hill-climbing attack (left) with an example of the evolution of the
scores (right). The threshold δ for which access to the system is granted is depicted by an horizontal
dashed line.
climbing attack is depicted. As may be observed, with each iteration the score increases, meaning
that we are closer to our objective: reaching an score higher than the threshold δ, depicted with
an horizontal dashed line.
Even though some research has been done in the field of indirect attacks to unimodal systems,
based on different traits, to the best of our knowledge there is no previous analysis of the
vulnerabilities of multimodal biometric systems against this kind of attacks. Some of those
works include the following ones. In [Adler, 2004], the authors successfully recover face images
from their templates, as a linear combination of eigenfaces. The hill-climbing algorithm works on
randomly selected quadrants of the eigenfaces, adding noise and modifying its pixels. This attack
also overcomes the score quantization countermeasure recommended by the BioAPI Consortium
[2001]. Later that year, in [Uludag and Jain, 2004], a hill-climbing attack that synthesizes
the target minutia templates is proposed. Starting with a random set of minutiae, individual
minutia are perturbed, added, replaced or deleted, until access to the system is granted. More
recently, Galbally et al. [2010] presented a hill-climbing attack algorithm based on Bayesian
adaptation to test the vulnerability of two face recognition systems, an eigenface- and a part-
based system, to indirect attacks. This algorithm models the faces subspace with an initial
Gaussian distribution, and adapts it to the specificities of the user account under attack. Finally,
Martinez-Diaz et al. [2011] thoroughly analyse the performance of several variations of hill-
climbing attacks to minutia-based fingerprint recognition systems, taking or not Regions Of
Interest into account. All the variations studied successfully generate fingerprint images able to
break into two different state-of-the-art verification systems. Score quantization is also tested
as a possible countermeasure, showing that it is an effective measure in order to prevent the
studied hill climbing attack, as the performance of the attacking algorithm drops drastically.
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2.2. Summary of Face Recognition
Many and quite different methods for face recognition have been proposed during the past
30 years. Face recognition is such a challenging problem that it has attracted researchers who
have different backgrounds (e.g., psychology, pattern recognition, neural networks, computer
vision, and computer graphics). Literature on face recognition is therefore vast and diverse. A
single system often involves techniques motivated by different principles, which leads to a usage
of a mixture of techniques that makes it difficult to classify these systems based purely on what
types of techniques they use for feature representation or classification. Following psychological
criteria on how humans use holistic and local features, face recognition systems can be broadly
divided into:
Holistic matching methods. These methods use the whole face region as the raw input to
a recognition system. One of the most widely used representations of the face region is
eigenpictures, which are based on principal component analysis (PCA) Turk and Pentland
[1991]. Another example includes the use of Fisherfaces, based on Fisher’s Linear Discrim-
inant (FLD) instead of PCA Belhumeur et al. [1997]. PCA is the method considered in
the present work.
Feature-based (structural) matching methods. Typically, in these methods, local features
such as the eyes, nose and mouth are first extracted and their locations and local statistics
(geometric and/or appearance) are fed into a structural classifier. Some examples include
the use of Hidden Markov Models Samaria and Fallside [1993] or Convolutional Neural
Networks Lawrence et al. [1997].
Hybrid methods. Just as the human perception system uses both local features and the
whole face region to recognize a face, an automatic recognition system can also take ad-
vantage of both techniques. For example, the algorithm proposed in [Huang et al., 2004],
combines holistic and feature analysis-based approaches using a Markov Random Field
(MRF) method.
Other techniques have been recently applied to face recognition, such as sparse representation
[Wright et al., 2009] and Local Binary Patterns (LBP) [Ahonen et al., 2006]. More detailed
surveys on face recognition methods may be found in [Tolba et al., 2006; Zhao et al., 2003].
2.3. Summary of Iris Recognition
The objective of this section is to briefly summarize those aspects of an iris recognition
system which are directly related to the present study and which are essential for the correct
understanding of the work. For a more comprehensive, descriptive and self-contained review on
automatic iris recognition the reader is referred to [Bowyer et al., 2008; Daugman, 2003, 2004,
2006, 2007, 2008].
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Figure 2.3: Example illustrating the segmentation (a), the normalization and occlusion mask (b), and
the encoding (c) stages used by most iris recognition systems.
Common iris recognition systems comprise five different stages: image acquisition, iris loca-
tion and segmentation, normalization, encoding and matching. As has been mentioned before,
the main objective of this work is to analyse the vulnerabilities of an iris-based recognition sys-
tem to the proposed indirect attack. Thus, although the acquisition and segmentation tasks may
be very challenging under certain scenarios (e.g., long distance acquisition, uncontrolled lighting
conditions, eye deviation, etc.) they are not relevant to this study and will not be treated here.
Normalization. Once the iris has been segmented, the vast majority of iris recognition
systems transform the annular-like iris pattern in cartesian coordinates to a normalized
rectangular image of fixed dimensions in pseudo-polar coordinates. These are the type
of images that will be reconstructed using the algorithm described in this work. The
normalization process may be reversed and the normalized iris patterns can be incorporated
again into the original eye images (of the same or of a different user).
Encoding. Although a number of methods have been reported in this stage, most of
them use some type of filtering strategy (typically based on Gabor Wavelet filters) prior to
quantizing the phasor response of the filtered output resulting in a binary representation
of the iris image (i.e., the iriscode).
Finally, two iriscodes are compared using a bitwise operator such as the Hamming distance.
In most cases, in the segmentation stage, a mask showing the occluded areas of the iris (e.g.,
due to the eyelids or eyelashes) is also generated. Thus, the matching score is only computed
using the “non-masked” bits of the iriscode.
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In Fig. 2.3 an example of the normalization and encoding stages is shown. The original iris
image appears on top (a) with the two white circles denoting the outer and inner boundaries
of the segmented iris. The corresponding normalized image along with the mask indicating the
occluded areas (b) and the final iriscode (c) are also shown.
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Chapter 3
Proposed Methods
In this chapter we introduce the methods proposed for the security evaluation of unimodal
and multimodal recognition systems described in Sect 4.2. Experimental results using these
methods are detailed in Chapter 5.
Until now, only the vulnerabilities of unimodal systems to indirect attacks have been anal-
ysed. In this section we present the first algorithm for the evaluation of the vulnerabilities of
multimodal systems to this type of threat. As can be observed in Fig. 3.1 (top), the input to the
algorithm are the scores given by the matcher, and the output the templates to be compared to
the client account.
For simplicity, the attacking methodology is described here for the particular case of a
multimodal system based on the score fusion of a real valued (e.g. face) and a binary (e.g.
iris) matcher. However, the proposed approach is general and may be applied with very small
modifications to attack multimodal systems working on: i) more than two traits represented
with real-valued or binary templates (by adding new blocks after the switch in Fig. 3.1), or ii)
feature-based fusion strategies (by rearranging the template disposition).
In order to attack a multimodal biometric system where one of the biometric traits is rep-
resented with real values and the other is binary (most iris recognition systems work on binary
templates), the algorithm here presented combines two sub-algorithms. Each of them attacks
one segment of the template: the real-valued or the binary segment. In the following subsec-
tions, each of the individual sub-algorithms is described (Sect. 3.1 and Sect. 3.2). Finally, the
multimodal attacking algorithm based on the previous two is presented (Sect. 3.3).
In Chapter 5, Sub-Algorithm 1 is used to attack a face verification system and the vulnera-
bilities of an iris recognition system are evaluated with Sub-Algorithm 2. Finally, the combined
algorithm is used to attack a multimodal biometric system based on face and iris, whose uni-
modal subsystems are the previous two unimodal systems. The same protocol, described in
Chapter 4, is followed in all evaluations, so that the vulnerabilities of these three systems are
compared in a fair fashion.
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Figure 3.1: Diagram of a general hill-climbing attack (top), with the specific modification scheme for
the combined algorithm (bottom).
3.1. Sub-Algorithm 1: Hill-Climbing based on the Uphill Sim-
plex Algorithm
Problem statement. Consider the problem of finding a K-dimensional vector of real values
xface which, compared to an unknown template Cface (in our case related to a specific client),
produces a similarity score bigger than a certain threshold δface, according to some matching
function Jface, i.e., Jface(Cface, xface) > δface. The template can be another K-dimensional vector
or a generative model of K-dimensional vectors.
Assumptions. Let us assume:
That there exists a statistical model G (K-variate Gaussian with mean µG and a diagonal
covariance matrix ΣG, with σ
2
G = diag(ΣG)), in our case related to a background set of
users, overlapping to some extent with Cface.
That we have access to the evaluation of the matching function Jface(Cface, xface) for several
trials of xface.
Algorithm. The problem stated above can be solved by adapting the Downhill Simplex
algorithm first presented in [Nelder and Mead, 1965] to maximize instead of minimize the func-
tion Jface. We iteratively form new simplices by reflecting one point, x
l
face, in the hyperplane of
the remaining points, until we are close enough to the maximum of the function. The point to
be reflected will always be the one with the lowest value given by the matching function, since
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Figure 3.2: Diagram of the modification scheme for the Sub-Algorithm 1, based on the Uphill Simplex
Algorithm.
it is in principle the one furthest from our objective. Thus, as can be observed in Fig. 3.2, the
different steps followed by the sub-algorithm 1 are:
1. Compute the statistical model G(µG, σG) from a development pool of users.
2. Take K + 1 samples (xiface) defining the initial simplex from the statistical model G and
compute the similarity scores Jface(Cface, x
i
face) = s
i
face, with i = 1, . . . ,K + 1.
3. Compute the centroid x¯face of the simplex as the average of x
i
face: x¯face =
1
K+1
∑
i x
i
face.
4. Reflect the point xlface according to the next steps, adapted from the Downhill Simplex
algorithm [Nelder and Mead, 1965]. In the following, the indices l and h are defined as
h = arg maxi(s
i
face), l = arg mini(s
i
face).
a) Reflection: Given a constant α > 0, the reflection coefficient, we compute:
a = (1 + α)x¯face − αxlface.
Thus, a is on the line between xlface and x¯face being α the ratio between the distances
[ax¯face] and [x
l
facex¯face]. If s
l
face < s
a
face < s
h
face we replace x
l
face by a. Otherwise, we go
on to step 4b.
b) Expansion or contraction.
1) Expansion: If saface > s
h
face (i.e., we have a new maximum) we expand a to b as
follows:
b = γa+ (1− γ)x¯face,
where γ > 1 is another constant called expansion coefficient, which represents
the ratio between the distances [bx¯face] and [sx¯face]. If s
b
face > s
h
face, we replace
xlface by b. Otherwise, we have a failed expansion and replace x
l
face by a.
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2) Contraction: If we have reached this step, then saface ≤ slface (i.e. replacing xlface
by a would leave saface as the new minimum). Afterwards we compute
b = βxlface + (1− β)x¯face,
where 0 < β < 1 is the contraction coefficient, defined as the ratio between the
distances [bx¯face] and [x
l
facex¯face]. If s
b
face > max(s
l
face, s
a
face), then we replace x
l
face
by b; otherwise, the contracted point is worse than xlface, and for such a failed
contraction we replace all the xiface’s by (x
i
face + x
h
face)/2.
5. With the new xlface value, update the simplex and return to step 3.
Stopping criteria. The algorithm stops when: i) the maximum similarity score of the
simplex vertices is higher than the threshold δface (i.e., the account is broken), ii) the variation
of the similarity scores obtained in a number of iterations is lower than a certain threshold or
iii) a maximum number of iterations is reached.
It is important to notice for the computation of the Efficiency (defined in Sect. 4.4) of this
sub-algorithm that at each iteration (except for the initial one) a maximum of 2 matchings will
be performed (i.e., saface + s
b
face). On average, the number of matchings computed per iteration
will be lower than 2 and greater than 1.
The hill-climbing based on the Uphill Simplex algorithm was first presented in [Gomez-
Barrero et al., 2011], where it was used to successfully attack a signature verification system.
3.2. Sub-Algorithm 2: Indirect Attack based on a Genetic Al-
gorithm
Problem statement. Consider the problem of finding an L-dimensional binary vector xiris
which, compared to an unknown template Ciris (in our case related to a specific client), produces
a similarity score bigger than a certain threshold δiris, according to some matching function Jiris,
i.e., Jiris(Ciris, xiris) > δiris. The template can be another L-dimensional vector or a generative
model of L-dimensional vectors.
Assumptions. Let us assume:
That we have access to the evaluation of the matching function Jiris(Ciris, xiris) for several
trials of xiris.
Algorithm. The problem stated above may be solved by using a genetic algorithm, which
has shown a remarkable performance in binary optimization problems [Brindle, 1981], to optimize
the similarity score given by the matcher, that is, the fitness value for an individual is siris =
Jiris(xiris,Ciris). As can be seen in Fig. 3.3 the steps followed by the sub-algorithm 2 are:
1. Generate an initial population Pi with N individuals of length L, being L the length of
the iris code.
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Figure 3.3: Diagram of the modification scheme for the Sub-Algorithm 2, based on a genetic algorithm.
2. Compute the similarity scores si of the individuals (xiiris) of the population Pi, s
i
iris =
J(xiiris,Ciris) with i = 1, . . . , N .
3. Four rules are used at each iteration to create the next generation Pn of individuals from
the current population:
a) Elite: the two individuals with the maximum similarity scores are kept unaltered for
the next generation.
b) Selection: certain individuals, the parents, are chosen by stochastic universal sam-
pling [Baker, 1987]. This way, the individuals with the highest fitness values (sim-
ilarity scores) are more likely to be chosen as parents for the next generation: one
subject can be selected 0 or many times. From the original N individuals, N/2 − 1
fathers and N/2− 1 mothers are chosen.
c) Crossover: parents are combined to form the N − 2 children of the next generation
following a scattered crossover method. A random binary vector is created and the
genes (bits) of the child are selected from the first parent where the value of the
random vector is 1, and from the second when it is 0 (vice versa for the second child).
d) Mutation: random changes are applied to the bit values of the new children with a
mutation probability pm.
4. Redefine Pi = Pn and return to step 2.
Stopping criteria. The algorithm stops when: i) the best fitness score is higher than the
threshold δiris (i.e., the account is broken), ii) the variation of the similarity scores obtained in a
number of generations is lower than a previously fixed value, or iii) when the maximum number
of generations is reached.
It is important to notice for the computation of the Efficiency (defined in Sect. 4.4) of this
sub-algorithm that at each iteration (i.e., generation) N matchings are performed (one for each
of the members of the population).
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3.3. Multimodal Attack: Combination of Sub-Algorithms 1 (Uphill-
Simplex) and 2 (Genetic-Algorithm)
Problem statement. Consider the problem of finding a (K + L)-dimensional vector x of
real and binary values which, compared to an unknown template C (in our case related to a
specific client), produces a similarity score bigger than a certain threshold δ, according to some
matching function J , i.e., J(C, x) > δ. The template can be another (K+L)-dimensional vector
or a generative model of (K + L)-dimensional vectors.
Assumptions. Let us assume:
That we know the distribution of the two subtemplates (real-valued xface and binary xiris)
within the multimodal template x.
That we have access to the evaluation of the matching function J(C, x) for several trials
of x.
Algorithm. The problem stated above may be solved by dividing the template x into
its real-valued (xface) and binary parts (xiris) and alternately optimize each of them as can
be seen in Fig. 3.1. In order to optimize each of the parts, the algorithms described in the
previous subsections are used: the Sub-Algorithm 1 for the real-valued segment (face) and the
Sub-Algorithm 2 for the binary segment (iris). Thus, the steps followed are:
1. Generate a synthetic template (x) randomly initializing the real-valued (xface) and binary
(xiris) segments, and compute the similarity score S = J(C, x), which will be used as
optimization criterion.
2. Leaving one of the segments unaltered, optimize the other segment of the template using
the appropriate sub-algorithm until one of the stopping criteria of the sub-algorithm is
fulfilled.
3. Change the optimization target to the segment which was previously left unaltered and go
back to step 2.
Stopping criteria. The algorithm stops when: i) the verification threshold is reached (i.e.,
access to the system is granted) or ii) the total number of iterations (i.e., changes between the
optimized segments) exceeds a previously fixed value (i.e., the attack has failed).
As will be analysed in the experimental section this algorithm may present different results
depending on whether it starts attacking the real-valued or binary part of the template.
It is very important to notice that the multimodal attacking algorithm does not have access
at any point to the partial scores of the unimodal modules (sface and siris) but only uses the
final fused score given by the system (S). This way, in the description of the previous two sub-
algorithms sface ad siris should be changed by S when they are used as part of the multimodal
attack and not individually.
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Chapter 4
Experimental Framework
The experimental framework followed throughout the present work is described in this
Chapter: firstly, the database used in the experiments is presented (Sect. 4.1); the recognition
systems attacked are then described (Sect. 4.2); a performance evaluation of those systems is
afterwards carried out (Sect. 4.3); and finally the vulnerability evaluation metrics are presented
(Sect. 4.4).
The results of these experiments are latter presented in Chapter 5.
The standard experimental protocol applied in other vulnerabilities evaluations and followed
in the present work comprises two different steps, namely: i) performance evaluation (Sect. 4.3),
and ii) security evaluation (Sect. 4.4). The first step allows us to establish the operating point at
which the system works in terms of the False Acceptance Rate, FAR, or percentage of impostors
accepted as genuine users, and the False Rejection Rate, FRR, or percentage of genuine users
rejected by the system. Once the operating point is fixed, in the second step we are able to
evaluate the attacking algorithm.
The reason why the two aforementioned stages of the experimental protocol must be carried
out is the dependence of the performance of the attacking schemes on the operating point of
the system considered (FAR-FRR). In general, the higher the FAR of the system under attack,
the higher the success chances of a given attack: a higher FAR means a higher probability of
accepting an impostor. Therefore, several operating points should be tested and specified in the
experimental framework, in order to compare these results with future studies.
4.1. Database
The experiments are carried out on the face and iris subcorpora included in the Desktop
Dataset of the multimodal BioSecure database [Ortega-Garcia et al., 2010], which comprises
voice, fingerprints, face, iris, signature and hand of 210 users, captured in two time-spaced
acquisition sessions. This database was acquired thanks to the joint effort of 11 European insti-
tutions and has become one of the standard benchmarks for biometric performance and security
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Figure 4.1: Typical samples of the face and iris images available in the Desktop Dataset of the multi-
modal BioSecure database.
evaluations [Mayoue et al., 2009]. It is publicly available through the BioSecure Foundation1.
The database comprises three datasets captured under different acquisition scenarios, namely:
i) Internet Dataset (DS1, captured through the Internet in an unsupervised setup), ii) Desk-
top Dataset (DS2, captured in an office-like environment with human supervision), and iii)
the Mobile Dataset (DS3, acquired on mobile devices with uncontrolled conditions). The face
subset used in this work includes four frontal images (two per session) with an homogeneous
grey background, and captured with a reflex digital camera without flash (210 × 4 = 840 face
samples), while the iris subset includes four grey-scale images (two per session as well) per eye,
all captured with the Iris Access EOU3000 sensor from LG. In the experiments only the right
eye of each user has been considered, leading this way as in the face case to 210 × 4 = 840 iris
samples.
Some samples of the iris and face images contained in the database are shown in Fig 4.1.
4.2. Recognition Systems Attacked
4.2.1. Face Recognition System
The hill-climbing attack based on the uphill-simplex algorithm described in Sect. 3.1 is used
to evaluate the security of an Eigenface-based face verification system [Turk and Pentland, 1991].
This technique uses Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to derive a vector which represents
the face images in a lower dimensional space, and it was used to present initial face verification
results for the recent Face Recognition Grand Challenge [Phillips et al., 2005].
The evaluated system uses cropped face images of size 64× 80 to train a PCA vector space
where 80% of the variance is retained. This leads to a system where the original image space
of 5120 dimensions is reduced to 100 dimensions (or eigenvectors). Similarity scores are com-
puted in this PCA vector space using the Euclidean distance, as it showed a very competitive
performance compared to the rest of the similarity measures tested.
1http://biosecure.it-sudparis.eu/AB
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Figure 4.2: Architecture of an automated iris verification system. Possible attack points are numbered
from 1 to 8.
The experiments are carried out on the face subcorpus included in the Desktop Dataset of the
BioSecure multimodal database [Ortega-Garcia et al., 2010]. The performance of the evaluated
system is computed using the experimental protocol shown in Fig. 4.4. The database is divided
into: i) a training set comprising the first three samples of 170 clients (used to compute both
the PCA transformation matrix and the enrolment templates), and ii) an evaluation set formed
by the fourth image of the previous 170 users (used to compute the genuine scores), and all the
4 images of the remaining 40 users with which the impostor scores are calculated. As a result
of using the same subjects for PCA training and client enrolment, the system performance is
optimistically biased, and therefore harder to attack than in a practical situation (in which
the enrolled clients may not have been used for PCA training). This means that the results
presented in this work are a conservative estimate of the attack’s success rate.
The final score given by the system is the average of the scores obtained after matching the
input vector to the three templates of the attacked client model C.
4.2.2. Iris Recognition System
In our experiments, we have used a modified version of the iris recognition system developed
by Masek and Kovesi [2003] 1, which is widely used in many iris related publications. As depicted
in Fig. 4.2, the system comprises four different steps:
Segmentation: the method proposed in [Ruiz-Albacete et al., 2008] is followed: the
system uses a circular Hough transform in order to detect the iris and pupil boundaries,
which are modelled as two circles.
Normalization: a technique based on Daugman’s rubber sheet model [Daugman, 2004]
is used, mapping the segmented iris region into a 2D array.
Feature encoding: the normalized iris pattern is convolved with 1D Log-Gabor wavelets.
The encoding process produces a binary template of 20 × 480 = 9, 600 bits and a corre-
sponding noise mask that represents the eyelids areas.
Matching: the inverse of the Hamming distance is used for matching. It is modified so
that it incorporates the noise mask, using only the significant bits. This modified Hamming
1The source can be freely downloaded from www.csse.uwa.edu.au/ pk/studentprojects/libor/sourcecode.html
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distance is given by the formula
HD =
∑L
j=1Xj(XOR)Yj(AND)X¯nj(AND)Y¯ nj
L−∑Lk=1Xnk(OR)Y nk
where Xj and Yj are the two bitwise templates to compare, Xnj and Y nj are the cor-
responding noise masks for Xj and Yj , and L is the number of bits comprised by each
template. X¯nj denotes the logical not operation applied to Xnj . A number of Hamming
distance values are calculated from successive shifts [Daugman, 2004], correcting this way
for misalignments in the normalized iris pattern caused by rotational differences during
imaging, being the lowest value finally taken.
For the experiments, the images that were not successfully segmented by the recognition
system (3.04% of the 1,680 images available) were segmented manually, allowing us this way
to use all of the available dataset. Furthermore, by doing this manual aided segmentation the
system performance is optimistically biased and therefore harder to attack than in a practical
situation (where the segmentation would be fully automatic).
The iris subset of the BioSecure DS2 [Ortega-Garcia et al., 2010] used in this work includes
four grey-scale images (two per session) per eye, all captured with the Iris Access EOU3000
sensor from LG. As before, the system performance evaluation protocol followed is the one
depicted in Fig. 4.4.
The final score given by the system is the average of the scores obtained after matching
the input binary vector to the three templates (i.e., iris codes) of the attacked client model C.
Furthermore, we run two different sets of experiments: i) we consider the left and right eyes
of one person as different clients, thus having twice as many clients (340) and impostors (80);
ii) we take the mean of the scores given by the matcher for each eye of the client as final score
(multimodal system considering both eyes for verification).
4.2.3. Multimodal Recognition System based on Face and Iris
The multimodal verification system evaluated in this work is the fusion of the two uni-
modal systems previously analysed, namely: i) a modified version of the iris recognition system
developed by L. Masek1 [Masek and Kovesi, 2003], which is widely used in many iris related
publications; and ii) an Eigenface-based face verification system [Turk and Pentland, 1991],
used to present initial face verification results for the recent Face Recognition Grand Challenge
[Phillips et al., 2005].
Given an input vector x, the system performs the following tasks in order to obtain the final
score, S, as can be seen in Fig. 4.3:
1. Compute the similarity scores obtained by the face (sface) and iris (siris) traits, as given
by the matchers described in Sect. 4.2.1 and Sect. 4.2.2.
1The source can be freely downloaded from www.csse.uwa.edu.au/ pk/studentprojects/libor/sourcecode.html
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Figure 4.3: Similarity score obtained from one multimodal template (x) consisting of two different
segments, containing: face features (xface, real values) and the iris code (xiris, binary). The unimodal
verification subsystems give the corresponding scores (sface, siris), which are then normalised (s
′
face, s
′
iris)
and fused to obtain the final output of the global system: S.
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Figure 4.4: Partition of the BioSecure DS2 DB according to the performance evaluation protocol defined.
2. Normalize the scores sk, with k = {face, iris}, using hyperbolic tangent estimators (its
robustness and high efficiency are proven in [Jain et al., 2005]):
s′k =
1
2
{
tanh
(
0.01
sk − µ
σ
)
+ 1
}
where sk is the original similarity score obtained by the iris (respectively face) section of
the template, µ and σ the mean and standard deviation of the scores distribution of the
iris (respectively face), and s′k the normalised score. This way, both partial scores (face
and iris) lie in the interval [0, 1].
3. Finally, both normalised scores are fused with a sum, given the very good results that
this fusion rule has presented even when compared with more sophisticated methods like
decision trees [Ross and Jain, 2003] or neural networks [Wang et al., 2003]:
S = s′iris + s
′
face
4.3. Performance Evaluation
The performance of the evaluated system is computed using the experimental protocol shown
in Fig. 4.4. The database is divided into: i) a training set comprising the first three samples of
170 clients, used as enrolment templates; and ii) an evaluation set formed by the fourth image
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Figure 4.5: DET curves of the three systems .
EER (%)
Face Iris Multimodal
Before Norm. 6.55 4.11 -
After Norm. 6.61 4.04 0.83
Table 4.1: EER of the unimodal and multimodal systems, based on face and iris, before and after the
normalization of the scores.
of the previous 170 users (used to compute the genuine scores), and all the 4 images of the
remaining 40 users (used to compute the impostor scores). The three operating points where
the hill-climbing algorithms are evaluated (corresponding to FAR = 0.1%, FAR = 0.05%, and
FAR = 0.01%) correspond to a low, medium, and high security application according to [ANSI,
2001].
In Fig. 4.5 the Detection Error Trade-off (DET) curves of the three systems considered using
the described protocol are depicted. The genuine scores are computed using the fourth sample
of each of the 170 users enrolled (170 genuine scores). In order to compute the impostor scores,
the first sample of the last 40 users is compared to each user model (40× 170 = 6, 800 impostor
scores).
Finally, the performance of each system is measured with the Equal Error Rate, or operating
point at which FAR = FRR, in Table 4.1. As may be observed, the EER of the multimodal
system (0.83%) is considerably lower that those of the unimodal systems fused (and, therefore,
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the system performance is higher): while the EERs of the unimodal systems were higher than
4% and 6%, respectively, the multimodal system shows an EER lower than 1%.
4.4. Vulnerabilities Evaluation
In order to generate the user accounts to be attacked with the proposed hill-climbing algo-
rithms, we used the train set defined in the performance evaluation protocol (i.e., three first
samples of 170 users as shown in Fig. 4.4). The performance of the attack will be evaluated in
terms of the Success Rate and Efficiency, defined as:
Success Rate (SR): it is the expected probability that the attack breaks a given account.
It is computed as the ratio between the number of broken accounts (AB) and the total
number of accounts attacked (AT = 170): SR = AB/AT . This parameter indicates how
dangerous the attack is: the higher the SR, the bigger the threat.
Efficiency (Eff): it is computed as the inverse of the average number of matchings needed
by the attack to break an account. It is defined as Eff = 1/
(∑AB
i=1 ni/AB
)
, where ni is the
number of matchings computed to bypass each of the broken accounts. This parameter
gives an estimation of how easy it is for the attack to break into the system in terms of
speed: the higher the Eff, the faster the attack.
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Chapter 5
Experimental Results
The experimental results of this thesis are covered in this chapter. Here, we have carried
out the security evaluations of two unimodal systems based on face (Sect. 5.1) and iris (Sect. 5.2),
and the fusion of both systems (Sect. 5.3). To that end, the attacking schemes described in
Chapter 3 are used, following the protocol presented in Chapter 4, so that a fair comparison
may be established.
5.1. Case Study I: Vulnerability Assessment of a Face Recogni-
tion System
The goal of these experiments is twofold, namely: i) on the one hand, study the vulnerability
of an automatic face recognition system to the proposed hill-climbing algorithm, and ii) on the
other hand, prove the efficiency of the attack against a biometric system based on a different
biometric trait (it was already used to successfully attack an on-line signature verification system
in [Gomez-Barrero et al., 2011]).
The performance of the attack at different operating point is studied in the first set of
experiments. Score Quantization is afterwards analysed as a possible countermeasure: its impact
on the SR and the Eff of the attack is studied.
5.1.1. Vulnerability Evaluation of Different Operating Points
The performance of the attack is tested at three different operating points, namely: i) FAR =
0.10%, ii) FAR = 0.05%, iii) FAR = 0.01%, which correspond to a low, medium and high secu-
rity application according to [ANSI, 2001]. Furthermore, these are the same operating points at
which a very similar face verification system was evaluated in [Galbally et al., 2010]. Therefore,
the results obtained in both works may be compared in a fair fashion. The results of the exper-
iments are detailed in Table 5.1. As can be observed, the algorithm presented here successfully
breaks all the attacked accounts, contrary to the Bayesian hill-climbing algorithm described in
[Galbally et al., 2010], existing a significant SR difference between the two approaches at the last
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FAR
Uphill-simplex HC Bayesian HC
SR Eff (×10−4) SR Eff (×10−4)
0.10% 100% 22.124 99.0% 11.905
0.05% 100% 22.472 98.5% 9.364
0.01% 100% 21.930 86.0% 2.226
Table 5.1: Eff and SR at the operating points tested, compared to those obtained by the Bayesian hill-
climbing attack in [Galbally et al., 2010].
FAR
Face Verif. System Signature Verif. Syst.
SR Eff (×10−3) SR Eff (×10−3)
0.05% 100% 2.2472 91.32% 0.8489
0.01% 100% 2.1930 88.43% 0.7391
Table 5.2: Eff and SR at the operating points tested, compared to those obtained with the on-line
signature verification system tested in [Gomez-Barrero et al., 2011].
operating point (i.e., 100% vs 86%). Moreover, while the efficiency decreases substantially along
the three operating points for the previous algorithm, for the attack proposed in the present
work it remains almost invariant, regardless of the operating point considered. This leads to an
efficiency which is ten times faster at the last operating point between the two attacks (i.e., 456
scores needed to break an account against almost 4,500).
It is also worth noting that the parameters of the algorithm are the same ones which were
optimized to attack an on-line signature verification system in [Gomez-Barrero et al., 2011]:
α = 1.1, β = 0.8, γ = 1.1. In that work, we performed three successive steps fixing in each of
them two of the parameters and sweeping the other in a given range. According to the original
Downhill Simplex algorithm [Nelder and Mead, 1965], the best values for the parameters are
α = 1, γ = 2 and β = 0.5. Thus, the selected ranges were centred on those values, taking always
into account the constraints explained in Sect. 3.1, namely: α > 0, γ > 1 and 0 < β < 1. Finally,
the parameters values (that will be used in the experiments in the present research work) were
set to [α, γ, β] = [1.1, 1.1, 0.8].
In Table 5.2 we show the Eff as well as the SR of the two common operating points (in terms of
FAR) attacked in both works. The fact that the SR and the Eff improve for the present case study
proves the robustness of the algorithm: it is able to break totally heterogeneous systems working
on different biometric traits, even improving its performance, without specifically adjusting its
parameters.
It should also be emphasized that in the present work the hill-climbing attack is initialized
from a normal distribution of zero mean and unit variance, that is, the first simplex is generated
without needing any training faces.
In Fig. 5.1 an example of the execution of the attack is shown. The evolution of the score
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Original Original-PCA
Iteration A IterationB Iteration C Iteration D Iteration E Iteration F
Figure 5.1: Example of the evolution of the score and the synthetic eigenfaces through the iterations of
the attack for a broken account. The dashed line represents the objective threshold.
through the iterations of the algorithm is depicted together with six points (including the first
and the last one) of the iterative process (marked with letters A to F). The dashed line represents
the objective value to be reached (i.e, the threshold δ). The two upper faces correspond to one of
the original images of the attacked user and its representation in the PCA space. The sequence
of the six faces below correspond to the feature vector that produced each of the six scores
marked with A to F. We can observe how the hill-climbing algorithm is able to evolve from a
totally random face (A) to an image (F) which is very similar to the target user (labelled as
“Original-PCA”).
This figure shows that the algorithm not only is able to break the system, but it is also
capable of reconstructing in a fairly precise way the face of the user, arising this way privacy
concerns.
5.1.2. Countermeasure: Score Quantization
The results achieved by the hill-climbing attack based on the uphill-simplex algorithm to the
face recognition system considered in the experiments have shown its high vulnerability to this
type of attacking approach and the need to incorporate some attack protection method that
increases its robustness to this threat.
When a countermeasure is introduced in a biometric system to reduce the risk of a particular
attack, it should be statistically evaluated considering two main parameters:
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QS 10−6 10−4 10−2 10−1 1 2.5 5
PI (%) 9.83 9.79 7.62 2.22 0.25 0.01 0.01
EER (%) 4.85 4.85 4.85 4.87 4.90 5.85 9.12
Table 5.3: Percentage of the iterations of the hill-climbing attack with a positive score increase (PI),
and EER of the system for different quantization steps (QS) of the matching score.
QS 10−6 10−1 2.5
SR 97.65% 78.24% 61.76%
Eff (×10−3) 2.0828 2.020 1.3158
Table 5.4: Performance (in terms of SR and Eff) of the hill-climbing attack against the system for
different quantization steps (QS).
Impact of the countermeasure in the system performance. The inclusion of a particular
protection scheme might change the FAR and FRR of a system, and these changes should
be evaluated and reported (other performance indicators such as speed or computational
efficiency might also change, but are not considered here).
Performance of the countermeasure, i.e. impact of the countermeasure in the SR and Eff
of the attack.
It is often argued that a simple account lockout policy (i.e., blocking the user accounts
after a number of consecutive unsuccessful access attempts) would be enough to prevent an
attack such as the one proposed in the present work. However, such countermeasures still leave
the system vulnerable to a spyware-based attack that interlaces its false attempts with the
attempts by genuine users (successful attempts) and collects information over a period of time
(i.e. piggyback attack). Furthermore, it may be used by the attacker to perform an account
lockout attack (i.e., the intruder tries to illegally access a great amount of accounts blocking all
of them and collapsing the system).
In this scenario, a specific design of the matching algorithm can also be implemented in order
to reduce the effects of this type of threats, providing this way an additional level of security
through a biometric-based protection scheme complementary to other possible non-biometric
countermeasures.
Among the biometric-based approaches to reduce the effects of hill-climbing attacks, score
quantization has been proposed as an effective countermeasure Adler [2004]. In fact, the BioApi
Consortium BioAPI [2009] recommends that biometric algorithms emit only quantized matching
scores. Such quantization means that small changes in the randomly generated templates will
normally not result in a modification of the matching score, so that the attack does not have
the necessary feedback from the system to be carried out successfully.
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With this precedents, in this section we analyse the performance of score quantization as
a possible countermeasure against the proposed attack. We will consider the Eigenface-based
system operating at medium security operating point (FAR = 0.05%). For the hill-climbing
attack we will assume the same configuration used in the vulnerability assessment experiments,
[α, β, γ] = [1.1, 0.8, 1.1] (which, as mentioned before, is taken from [Gomez-Barrero et al., 2011]).
In order to select the appropriate quantization step according to the trade-off that should
be met in terms of its impact on the system performance (ideally as small as possible) and on
the attack performance (as big as possible), several Quantization Steps (QS) are tested in terms
of their corresponding Positive Increment, PI (i.e., percentage of iterations that produced an
increase in the similarity score higher than the quantization step considered). The Equal Error
Rate (EER) is the point at which FAR = FRR, and gives a measure of the system performance:
the lower the EER, the better the performance.
From results shown in Table 5.3 we can see that for the last QS considered (5) the EER
suffers a big increase (QS is too big), while for the previous QS values the system performance is
not affected. Therefore, the hill-climbing attack is repeated considering the three QS values QS
= 10−6, QS = 10−1, and QS = 2.5 . Results are presented in Table 5.4, where we can see that
score quantization reduces the success chances of the attack (for bigger QS, the SR decreases).
However, it can also be noticed that the attacking algorithm is quite robust to this type of
countermeasure, as even for the biggest value of QS (increasing it would imply a deterioration
of the system EER as shown in Table 5.3), the SR of the attack is still over 60%.
5.2. Case Study II: Vulnerability Assessment of an Iris Recog-
nition System
The goal of these experiments is twofold, namely: i) study the vulnerability of an automatic
iris recognition system against the proposed attack, and ii) find the most consistent bits in the
iris code and analyse whether that information can increase the robustness of the system.
The performance of the attack at different operating point is studied in the first set of
experiments. The impact of using only the most consistent bits of the iriscode for verification
on the SR and the Eff of the attack is then studied.
5.2.1. Vulnerability Evaluation of Different Operating Points
The performance of the attack is measured at four different operating points, namely: i)
FAR = 0.10%, ii) FAR = 0.05%, iii) FAR = 0.01%, and iv) FAR  0.01%, representing a very
high security point. As can be observed in Table 5.5, where the results of the experiments are
detailed, the attacking algorithm proposed in this work successfully breaks most of the attacked
accounts (around 80% SR on average for all the scenarios considered). Moreover, the number of
comparisons needed increases only about 25% between the operating points FAR = 0.1% and
FAR = 0.01% (while a brute force attack using randomly chosen real irises to access the system
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FAR
One iris Both irises
SR Eff (×10−4) SR Eff (×10−4)
0.10% 91.18% 1.400 98.24% 0.736
0.05% 80.89% 1.255 95.29% 0.686
0.01% 62.36% 1.102 83.53% 0.603
0.01% 52.06% 1.051 59.41% 0.506
Table 5.5: Eff and SR of the attack at the operating points tested, for the system employing only one
eye and both eyes of the user for the verification of the identity claim.
Figure 5.2: Evolution of the maximum score (smax) reached for every generation of the genetic algorithm
for two different broken accounts in the two scenarios studied: one (left) and both irises (right). The
verification threshold is marked with a horizontal dashed line.
would need about 1/FAR ' ten times as many matchings).
On the other hand, when comparing the system for the two scenarios considering one and
both eyes of a client for verification, an improvement in terms of SR can be observed. The main
reason for this is that with larger individuals (the number of bits is multiplied by two in the
scenario which takes into account both eyes) and a population twice as big, more diversity can
be achieved. Therefore, the algorithm converges to a global rather than to a local minimum of
the fitness function (i.e., the score given by the matcher). The difference in terms of efficiency
between the two scenarios is due to the population sizes: for one eye, only 50 individuals are
computed, while for both eyes, 100 individuals are created in order to have enough diversity
in the population. Having twice as many individuals implies that the number of matchings
computed per generation is double, and hence the efficiency is divided by two.
Also worth noting the fact that the efficiency does not depend greatly on the operating
point attacked. This is confirmed by the experiment run at an operating point of FAR 
0.01% (Table 5.5), where the efficiency has only decreased in about 30% compared to the point
with FAR = 0.1% (an eventual brute force attack would need on average over 100 times more
matchings).
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Figure 5.3: Percentage of fragile bits (the ones flipping at least once across the images of an iris) in a
row.
Finally, in Fig. 5.2 the evolution of the maximum score obtained by the best individual of
each generation for two successful attacks, against the scenarios considering one and both irises
for verification, are depicted. The verification threshold, where access is granted to the system,
is marked with a horizontal dashed line. As we can see in both cases, the matching score steadily
increases through the generations (i.e., in each generation the best individual of the population
is more similar to the client being attacked) until the positive recognition value is reached.
5.2.2. Countermeasure: Most Consistent Bits in the Iris Code
According to the analysis made by Hollingsworth et al. in [Hollingsworth et al., 2009], there
are some bits more fragile than others in an iris code, that is, bits that flip between 0 and 1 in
different images of the same iris with a high probability. Here we consider that a bit is consistent,
(i.e., not fragile), when it does not flip in any of the four images available for each user. In order
to determine the most consistent rows of bits in the iris code, we follow the method described
in [Hollingsworth et al., 2009]: we compute the frequency (that must lie between 0% and 50%)
that each unmasked bit flips, and take the average frequency across all bits in a row for each
subject. All the codes of each user are previously aligned, keeping the rotation that gives the
minimum Hamming distance to the first code of that user. In Fig. 5.3, the mean percentage of
bits considered fragile in each row across all users is depicted. As can be observed, rows 3 to 11
are the more consistent ones, having the lower percentages of fragile bits.
Based on these results and the ones in [Hollingsworth et al., 2009], where the more consistent
rows were found to be 5 to 12, we run some experiments testing the impact of reducing the
number of rows of the iris codes: from using all rows (1 - 20) to only the best ones found in
[Hollingsworth et al., 2009] (5 - 12). The results, all obtained at an operating point of FAR
= 0.05%, can be observed in Fig. 5.4. While the Hamming distance between iris codes is
lower for a lower number of rows used in order to bypass the system, the Equal Error Rate
(EER) does not vary greatly (see Table. 5.6) and as can be observed the attack improves its
performance, both in terms of Eff and SR. The main reason for this is that, by decreasing the
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Figure 5.4: SR and Eff of the attack varying the number of rows used by the matcher, for a system
comprising only one eye per client (left) and both eyes (right).
EER
Rows 1 - 20 2 - 18 3 - 16 4 - 14 5 - 12
One iris 3.82% 3.23% 3.56% 4.41% 5.00%
Both irises 0.58% 0.59% 0.59% 0.60% 1.17%
Table 5.6: EER for the system tested under the two scenarios considered (one and both eyes), and
for a decreasing number of rows of the iris code (from the least to the most consistent according to
[Hollingsworth et al., 2009]).
number of rows compared, the number of bits drops drastically while the number of individuals
in the population remains the same, thus increasing the diversity of the population and thereby
enabling the genetic algorithm to find a maximum faster.
Finally, in Table 5.7 the performance of the attack against the system using only the most
consistent bits found in the present work (rows 3 to 11) is shown and compared to the perfor-
mance using all the bits. The EER for the system is 5.00% for only one eye and 0.69% for both
eyes, again similar to the EER of the original system. However, the SR is as high as 98% and
100%, needing also less matchings on average. Thus, we may conclude that using only the most
consistent bits in the iris code does not improve the robustness of the system to the proposed
attacking algorithm.
Rows
One eye Both eyes
SR Eff (×10−4) SR Eff (×10−4)
1 - 20 80.89% 1.255 95.29% 0.586
3 - 11 98.53% 1.684 100% 0.690
Table 5.7: Eff and SR at the operating point FAR = 0.05%, for the systems employing only one eye of
the user and both eyes for the verification of the identity claim, and all rows of the iris code or only the
most consistent ones.
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FAR
Starts face Starts iris
SR Eff (×10−4) SR Eff (×10−4)
0.10% 100% 1.9372 100% 1.4180
0.05% 100% 1.8218 100% 1.3585
0.01% 100% 1.3702 100% 1.0532
Table 5.8: Eff and SR of the attack at the operating points tested, for attack starting with either the
face or the iris part of the template.
Unimodal Attacks Multimodal Attack
FAR
Sub-Alg. 1 vs Face Sub-Alg. 2 vs Iris Starts Face Starts Iris
SR Eff (×10−4) SR Eff (×10−4) SR Eff (×10−4) SR Eff (×10−4)
0.10% 100% 22.472 91.18% 1.400 100% 1.9372 100% 1.4180
0.05% 100% 22.124 80.89% 1.255 100% 1.8218 100% 1.3585
0.01% 100% 21.930 62.36% 1.102 100% 1.3702 100% 1.1112
Table 5.9: Eff and SR for the Sub-Algorithm 1 (Uphill-Simplex) and Sub-Algorithm 2 (Genetic Algo-
rithm) attacks carried out against the corresponding unimodal systems, and for the Multimodal Attack
against the multimodal system.
5.3. Case Study III: Vulnerability Assessment of a Multimodal
Recognition System based on Face and Iris
The main goal of this first study of the vulnerabilities of a multimodal system to an indirect
attack is to prove whether the combination of two different and independent biometric traits
increases the security offered by the system as well as its performance.
The first set of experiments evaluates the performance of the attack on different operating
points (security evaluation). Afterwards, score quantization is analysed as a possible counter-
measure, studying its impact on the SR and the Eff of the attacking scheme.
5.3.1. Vulnerability Evaluation of Different Operating Points
As it was previously stated, the multimodal system is evaluated at three different operating
points. Two set of results are shown in Table 5.8: the attack can start working on the part
of the template corresponding to the face (it starts with the proposed hill-climbing, randomly
initializing the iris part) or on the iris part of the template (it starts with the genetic algorithm,
randomly initializing the face part). As it may be observed, the SR is in both cases as high
as 100% at all operating points. However, the Eff of the algorithm decreases about 25% when
it starts with the genetic algorithm. This is due to the fact that the hill-climbing needs much
less comparisons that the GA (see Tables 5.1 and 5.5). Additionally, when the attack starts
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Starts Face Starts Iris 
Figure 5.5: Evolution of the maximum score (smax) obtained in each generation by the genetic algorithm
or in each iteration by the hill-climbing under the studied scenarios for two different broken accounts:
starting with the face part of the template (left) or with the iris part (right). The verification threshold is
represented by a dashed horizontal line.
with the iris part of the template, between a 40% (at the operating point corresponding to FAR
= 0.01%) and 60% (at the operating point corresponding to FAR = 0.1%) of the accounts are
broken by modifying only the iris part of the template and leaving unaltered the initial random
face part. On the other hand, when the attack starts with the face part, both segments of the
template have to be modified for all the attacked accounts.
In Table 5.9, the results achieved when starting with the face part of the template are
compared to those achieved by the unimodal systems. We can observe that the most robust
system both in term of SR and Eff is the unimodal iris-based. The weakest one is the face-
based unimodal system: even though the SR is 100% for the multimodal system as well, the Eff
decreases over 10 times at all operating points.
Finally, the evolution of the maximum scores obtained in each generation (by the genetic
algorithm) or in each iteration (by the hill-climbing) is depicted in Fig. 5.5. On the leftmost
figure, the attack starts working on the face part of the template, and we can observe segments
with different slopes, depending on which part of the template is being modified. Furthermore,
in the first and third segments, after the score remains constant for 50 iterations, the algorithm
automatically switches to the other part of the template. However, On the rightmost figure,
the curve comprises only one segment: the attack started with the genetic algorithm and never
changed to the hill-climbing.
Taking into account the results here presented, we may conclude that security is not improved
by the fusion of the two unimodal system as it occurs with the performance of the system (EER
decreases from 5% to 0.8%); the proposed attack seriously compromises the security offered by
the multimodal system.
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Figure 5.6: Two possible quantization modes: before the fusion of the scores (top) or after (bottom),
where s′face and s
′
iris are the normalised scores given by the face and iris matchers, and S the final score
given by the multimodal system.
5.3.2. Countermeasure: Score Quantization
The efficiency of quantizing the scores, already evaluated for the face-based unimodal system,
is here analysed against the proposed multimodal attack.
Since the global score in this multimodal system is obtained from two previous partial (face
and iris) scores that are normalised and then fused, the quantization can take place either before
or after this sum or fusion. Both schemes are presented in Fig. 5.6, and will be evaluated and
compared in this section. The nomenclature of Sect. 5.1.2 will be used.
In order to select the appropriate quantization step according to the trade-off that should
be met in terms of its impact on the system performance (ideally as small as possible) and
on the attack performance (as big as possible), we try several Quantization Steps (QS) and
consider the corresponding PI. The EER of the system with the different QS is computed when
the quantization is applied before and after the score fusion. The QS considered range from
10−8 and 10−1. Results are shown in Table. 5.10. For the last QS (10−1), the EER increases
considerably (i.e., the QS is too big), while for the remaining values the performance of the
system is not significantly affected. The multimodal attack is therefore repeated applying the
other four QS values, namely: i) QS = 10−4, ii) QS = 10−3, iii) QS = 10−2, and iv) QS =
10−1.
In Table 5.11 the results of these experiments are shown. As it can be seen, the quantization
of the scores is effective as a countermeasure against the combined attacking algorithm presented
in this work when it is applied:
Before the fusion with a QS = 10−2. Since the rounding effect of quantizing the scores and
then summing them is bigger than that obtained when fusing the scores before applying the
quantization, the performance of the attack decreases more when applying the quantization
before the fusion. This leads to a SR = 0% for the QS = 10−2 when the partial scores are
quantized before fusing them.
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QS 10−8 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1
PI (%) 33.69 21.68 0.58 0.01 0.01
EER (%) Before 0.8272 0.8363 0.9990 1.3676 32.659
EER (%) After 0.8272 0.8364 0.9706 1.6912 15.2941
Table 5.10: Percentage of the iterations of the combined attack with a positive increment (PI), and EER
of the system for different quantization steps (QS) for the similarity scores, applying the quantization
before and after the fusion of the scores.
QS 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1
Before
SR 100% 100% 0% 0%
Eff (×10−4) 1.8932 1.6113 - -
After
SR 100% 100% 100% 0%
Eff (×10−4) 1.7806 1.7921 1.7470 -
Table 5.11: Performance (in terms of SR and Eff) of the combined attack against the system considering
different quantization steps (QS), applied before and after the fusion of the scores.
Before or after the fusion with a QS = 10−1. With this QS, the system is able to stop the
attack regardless of the point where the scores are quantized. As in the previous case, the
attack does not receive the necessary feedback from the system on whether it has managed
to increase or not the similarity score, and thus fails to achieve its objective.
In both cases listed above, no account is broken, while for the remaining trials the SR of
the attack is still 100%, only decreasing its Eff (i.e., more comparisons are needed to break an
account). However, while the performance of the system is not considerably affected in the first
case (EER = 1.37%), it is barely acceptable with a QS = 10−1: the EER is as high as 32.66%.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
This MSc Thesis has considered the problem of evaluating the security offered by biomet-
ric systems. Three different hill-climbing attacks were considered throughout the experiments,
based on hill-climbing and genetic algorithms, aiming at supplanting the identity of the user.
After a summary of the state of the art in face and iris recognition systems, the vulnerabilities
evaluation methodologies followed in the MSc Thesis have been presented. These procedural
guidelines for the systematic and objective vulnerabilities evaluation of biometric systems have
been applied in the experimental studies described in the last chapters of the Dissertation to
several publicly available or commercial systems. Besides, in the experimental chapters of the
Dissertation, the efficiency of these attacking schemes has been explored, and possible counter-
measures tested.
6.1. Conclusions
As case study, we have tested the proposed algorithms on a system based on face and iris
(multimodal attack), a trait combination regarded as user-friendly: the features of both traits
may be extracted from images the can be captured at the same time, being the acquisition
process transparent to the user. The attacking algorithm shows a remarkable performance,
thus proving the vulnerabilities of multimodal systems to this type of attacks. Furthermore,
the multimodal system has not presented an improvement in the security level against this
kind of attack compared to the face and iris modules on their own. This fact confirms what
previous studies on spoofing attacks pointed out: even though multimodal systems recognition
performance is higher, they do not necessarily increase the robustness of unimodal approaches
to external attacks.
The quantization of the scores given by the matcher is analysed as a possible countermeasure.
Two different approaches are studied and compared: the partial scores can be quantized before
fusing them, or the final score can be quantized after the fusion. The first scenario leads to a null
success rate without affecting the verification performance of the system, being thus a suitable
countermeasure for the proposed attack. The second case also protects the system against the
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attack but at the cost of drastically reducing its verification performance.
In summary, the main results and contributions obtained from this MSc Thesis are:
The vulnerabilities evaluation protocol followed throughout the first set of experiments.
The three different algorithmic methods developed and used for evaluating the security of
biometric systems, based on optimization algorithms.
The experimental evidence of the vulnerabilities of biometric systems to this attacks.
The results of applying score quantization or the use of the most consistent bits of the
iriscode as possible countermeasures against hill-climbing based attacks.
6.2. Future Work
Studies as the one performed in the present work are necessary for the improvement and
development of any technology. That is specially the case with new fields of research, such as
biometrics.
In order to prevent future attacks, we have to know what we can expect from the eventual
attackers. That is the base of the security through transparency principle described in Chapter 1.
However, knowing what the attacker can do is not enough: we should develop appropriate
countermeasures so that eventual impostors are rejected by the recognition systems.
A number of research lines arise from the work carried out in this MSc Thesis. We consider
of special interest the following ones:
Inverse biometrics: this reverse engineering process tries to obtain the initial biometric
trait starting from the template. In the past, it has been a common belief that templates
do not comprise enough information in order to reconstruct the original sample from them
[International Biometric Group, 2002]. However, recent studies have arisen several con-
cerns regarding the soundness of this widely spread belief for traits such as the fingerprint
[Cappelli et al., 2007], the iris [Venugopalan and Savvides, 2011] or the face [Galbally et al.,
2010]. Applying the hill-climbing algorithms here proposed to the appropriate input may
lead to the reconstruction of biometric traits [Gomez-Barrero et al., 2012], that may be
regarded as a new kind of attack (once we have the reconstructed trait, we can present it to
gain access as a different user), or used to create synthetic databases or even synthetically
enlarge existing ones for development purposes.
Countermeasures: liveness detection. One of the most common countermeasures against
spoofing attacks is liveness detection: if the trait presented to the sensor does not fulfil
certain requirements, such as heat variation or a minimal trembling, the user is automat-
ically rejected. Even though some research has been conducted on this area, this kind of
countermeasures still needs to be further explored.
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Template Protection: a new topic of interest is the protection of biometric templates
using techniques imported from the cryptography experts [Rathgeb and Uhl, 2011]. This
is a difficult problem, since the input for cryptographic systems must remain invariant
in order to obtain the correct key. However, biometric templates suffer from noise and
the acquisition conditions often vary (pose, illumination, etc.), and those changes lead to
similar but not identical templates. Protecting biometric templates would prevent inverse
biometric attacks and at the same time protect the privacy of the user.
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a b s t r a c t
In certain applications based on multimodal interaction it may be crucial to determine not only what the
user is doing (commands), but who is doing it, in order to prevent fraudulent use of the system. The
biometric technology, and particularly the multimodal biometric systems, represent a highly efﬁcient
automatic recognition solution for this type of applications.
Although multimodal biometric systems have been traditionally regarded as more secure than uni-
modal systems, their vulnerabilities to spooﬁng attacks have been recently shown. New fusion tech-
niques have been proposed and their performance thoroughly analysed in an attempt to increase the
robustness of multimodal systems to these spooﬁng attacks. However, the vulnerabilities of multimodal
approaches to software-based attacks still remain unexplored. In this work we present the ﬁrst software
attack against multimodal biometric systems. Its performance is tested against a multimodal system
based on face and iris, showing the vulnerabilities of the system to this new type of threat. Score quan-
tization is afterwards studied as a possible countermeasure, managing to cancel the effects of the pro-
posed attacking methodology under certain scenarios.
 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Multimodal systems represent a new direction for computing
that embraces users’ natural behaviour as the center of human–
computer interaction (Oviatt and Cohen, 2000). As with any other
novel discipline, the research community is just beginning to
understand how to design robust and well integrated multimodal
systems. But only trough multidisciplinary cooperation among
those with expertise in individual component technologies can
multimodal systems reach its ﬁnal aim: building more general
and robust systems that will reshape daily computing tasks and
have signiﬁcant commercial impact (Oviatt, 1999).
One of the main areas of research in multimodal interaction,
where speciﬁc expertise is needed, is recognition, generally re-
garded as a form of processing users’ commands. However, for cer-
tain applications based on multimodal interaction, a second form
of recognition is crucial: it is not only necessary to distinguishwhat
the user is doing, but who is doing it, so that non-authorized indi-
viduals cannot use the system. For these cases, a robust personal
automatic recognition solution such as the one provided by
biometrics is required. Although being relatively young compared
to other mature and long-used security technologies, biometrics
have emerged in the last decade as a pushing alternative for appli-
cations where automatic recognition of people is needed. Certainly,
biometrics are very attractive and useful for the ﬁnal user: forget
about PINs and passwords, you are your own key (Jain et al.,
2006; Wayman et al., 2005). However, we cannot forget that as
any technology aimed to provide a security service, biometric sys-
tems are exposed to external attacks which could compromise
their integrity (Schneier, 1999). Thus, it is of special relevance to
understand the threats to which they are subjected and to analyse
their vulnerabilities in order to prevent possible attacks and in-
crease their beneﬁts for the users.
External attacks to biometric systems are commonly divided
into: direct attacks (also known as spooﬁng attacks), carried out
against the sensor, and indirect attacks, directed to some of the in-
ner modules of the system. In the last recent years important re-
search efforts have been conducted to study the vulnerabilities of
biometric systems to both direct and indirect attacks (Galbally
et al., 2010, 2011; Matsumoto, 2004; Uludag and Jain, 2004).
This new concern which has arisen in the biometric community
regarding the security of biometric systems has led to the appearance
of several international projects, like the European Tabula Rasa (2010),
which base their research on the security through transparencyprinci-
ple (Schneier, 2000; Kerckhoffs, 1883): in order to make biometric
systems more secure and reliable, their vulnerabilities need to be
analysed and useful countermeasures need to be developed.
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Abstract
The present work proposes a novel probabilistic method to reconstruct a hand
shape image from its template. We analyse the degree of similarity between the
reconstructed images and the original samples in order to determine whether the
synthetic hands are able to deceive hand recognition systems. This analysis is
made through the estimation of the success chances of an attack carried out with
the synthetic samples against three different state-of-the-art independent systems.
The experimental results show that there is a high probability of breaking a hand
recognition system using this approach. Furthermore, since it is a probabilistic
method, several synthetic images can be generated from each original sample,
which increases the success chances of the attack.
Keywords: Biometric systems, Hand recognition, Hand reconstruction, Security,
Vulnerabilities
1. Introduction
Biometrics are nowadays being introduced into many applications as an alter-
native to traditional security mechanisms [42, 83]. The main advantage of bio-
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Abstract
A binary iriscode is a very compact representation of an iris image. For a long
time it was assumed that the iriscode did not contain enough information to al-
low for the reconstruction of the original iris. The present work proposes a novel
probabilistic approach based on genetic algorithms to reconstruct iris images from
binary templates and analyzes the similarity between the reconstructed synthetic
iris image and the original one. The performance of the reconstruction technique
is assessed by empirically estimating the probability of successfully matching the
synthesized iris image against its true counterpart using a commercial matcher.
The experimental results indicate that the reconstructed images look reasonably
realistic. While a human expert may not be easily deceived by them, they can suc-
cessfully deceive a commercial matcher. Furthermore, since the proposed method-
ology is able to synthesize multiple iris images from a single iriscode, it has other
potential applications including privacy enhancement of iris-based systems.
Keywords: Image reconstruction, Biometric systems, Iris recognition, Binary
iriscodes, Security, Privacy
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Abstract
The vulnerabilities of a PCA-based face verification sys-
tem against a hill-climbing attack using the uphill-simplex
algorithm are studied. Experiments are carried out on the
face subcorpus of the publicly available BioSecure DB,
where the attack has shown a remarkable performance
proving the lack of robustness of the tested system to this
type of threat. Furthermore, the proposed attacking scheme
is not only able to bypass the security of the recognition
system, but it is also capable of reconstructing the users
face image, with the privacy concerns that this entails. As
a possible countermeasure to minimize the effect of the at-
tack, score quantization is applied. This protection method
is able to reduce both the success rate and the efficiency of
the attack, however it does not completely succeed in pre-
venting a possible intruder from accessing the system. The
study also highlights the high adaptation capabilities of the
proposed attack which had already been used to break a
signature-based verification system.
1. Introduction
Due to the fact that biometrics [10], as an automatic
means of human recognition, constitutes a relatively novel
field of research, most efforts undertaken by the different
parties involved in the development of this technology (re-
searchers, industry, evaluators, etc.) have been mainly (but
not exclusively) directed to the improvement of its perfor-
mance [11]. This has left partially uncovered other impor-
tant aspects involved in the complex biometric recognition
problem.
In particular, it has not been until recently when biomet-
ric security assessment has emerged in the biometric com-
munity as a primary field of research, as a consequence of
the concern arisen after the classification of the vulnerabil-
ity points presented in [16] (shown in Fig. 1), and the dif-
ferent efficient attacking algorithms developed in order to
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Figure 1. Architecture of an automated biometric verification sys-
tem. Possible attack points given in [16] are numbered from 1 to
8.
compromise the security level given by biometric applica-
tions [6, 19].
These vulnerability studies have helped to improve the
biometric technology by making public certain flaws and
by encouraging the industry and researchers to look for so-
lutions to the different threats [9, 22, 18]. This way, the level
of security and the convenience offered to the final user are
increased.
Most of the existing works studying the vulnerabilities
of biometric systems to attacks against the inner modules of
the system (those labeled from 2 to 8 in Fig. 1), use some
type of variant of the hill-climbing algorithm presented in
[17]. Some examples include an attack to a face-based sys-
tem in [2], and to standard and Match-on-Card minutiae-
based fingerprint verification systems in [21] and [12] re-
spectively. These types of attacks take advantage of the
score given by the matcher to iteratively change a synthet-
ically generated template until the similarity score exceeds
a fixed decision threshold and thereby access to the system
is granted. Except for the algorithm proposed in [7], all of
these hill-climbing approaches are highly dependent on the
technology used, only being usable for very specific types
of matchers.
However, recently, a general hill-climbing algorithm
based on the uphill-simplex algorithm was presented and
tested using a signature verification system [8]. In the
present contribution this general method is successfully ap-
plied to attack an automatic face recognition system based
on eigenfaces, proving this way its biometric independency
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Abstract. The vulnerabilities of a standard iris verification system to a novel
indirect attack based on a binary genetic algorithm are studied. The experiments
are carried out on the iris subcorpus of the publicly available BioSecure DB. The
attack has shown a remarkable performance, thus proving the lack of robustness
of the tested system to this type of threat. Furthermore, the consistency of the bits
of the iris code is analysed, and a second working scenario discarding the fragile
bits is then tested as a possible countermeasure against the proposed attack.
Keywords: Security, vulnerabilities, iris recognition, genetic algorithm, countermea-
sures.
1 Introduction
Due to their advantages over traditional security approaches, biometric security sys-
tems are nowadays being introduced into many applications where a correct identity
assessment is a crucial issue, such as access control or sensitive data protection [1].
These systems perform automatic recognition of individuals based on anatomical (e.g.,
fingerprint, face, iris, etc.) or behavioural characteristics (e.g., signature, gait, keystroke
dynamics). Among these traits, the iris has been traditionally regarded as one of the
most reliable and accurate [1].
However, biometric systems are vulnerable to external attacks, that can be divided
into two different groups, namely: i) direct attacks, carried out against the sensor using
synthetic traits [2]; and ii) indirect attacks, carried out against one of the inner mod-
ules of the system [3], and thus requiring some knowledge about the inner working of
the system. Several works have already studied the robustness of iris-based biometric
systems against direct attacks, including attackers wearing contact lenses with artificial
textures printed onto them [4] and fake iris images [5].
In the present paper, a novel indirect attack based on a genetic algorithm is pre-
sented. The point of attack are binary templates, as depicted in Fig. 1 (top), where a
general hill-climbing attack is shown. Although other hill-climbing attacks have been
proposed [6, 3, 7], none of them work on binary templates, but on real-valued feature
vectors or directly on the sample images.
Although in commercial systems the number of consecutive unsuccessful access
attempts is usually restricted, this countermeasure has been circumvented in different
occasions or may even be used to compromise the system by performing an account
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Abstract. A general hill-climbing attack to biometric systems based on
a modiﬁcation of the downhill simplex algorithm is presented. The scores
provided by the matcher are used in this approach to adapt iteratively
an initial estimate of the attacked template to the speciﬁcities of the
client being attacked. The proposed attack is evaluated on a competitive
feature-based signature veriﬁcation system over both the MCYT and
the BiosecurID databases (comprising 330 and 400 users, respectively).
The results show a very high eﬃciency of the hill-climbing algorithm,
which successfully bypassed the system for over 90% of the attacks with
a remarkably low number of scores needed.
1 Introduction
Biometric security systems are nowadays being introduced in many applications,
such as access control, sensitive data protection, on-line tracking systems, etc.,
due to their advantages over traditional security approaches [1]. Nevertheless,
they are also susceptible to external attacks that can decrease their security level.
Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to analyse the vulnerabilities of biomet-
ric systems so that their weaknesses can be found and useful countermeasures
against foreseeable attacks can be developed.
There are two main types of attacks that may put at risk the security oﬀered
by a biometric system: (i) direct attacks, carried out against the sensor using
synthetic traits, such as printed iris images or gummy ﬁngers [2]; and (ii) indirect
attacks, carried out against some of the inner modules of the system [3, 4], and
thus requiring for the attacker to have some knowledge about the system (e.g.,
storage format or matcher used). A more detailed analysis of the vulnerable
points of biometric systems is made by Ratha et al. in [5]. In this work 8 possible
points of attack are identiﬁed, the ﬁrst corresponding to direct ones and the
remaining seven to indirect attacks.
Several works have already studied the robustness of biometric systems against
direct attacks, specially ﬁngerprint- and iris-based, including [2, 3, 6]. In the case
of indirect attacks, most of the studies use some kind of variant of the hill-
climbing algorithm [4]. Some examples include an indirect attack to a face-based
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Abstract
Recently, a considerable amount of research has been
focused on inverse biometrics, that is, regenerating the
original biometric sample from its template. In this
work, the first reconstruction approach to recover hand
geometry samples from their feature vectors is proposed.
Experiments are carried out on the publicly available
GPDS Hand DB, where the method has shown a remark-
able performance, after reconstructing a very high per-
centage of the hands included in the dataset. Further-
more, the proposed technique is general, being able to
successfully reproduce the original hand shape sample
regardless of the information and format of the template
used.
1. Introduction
Automatic access of persons to services is becoming
increasingly important in the information era. This has
resulted in the establishment of a new technological area
known as biometric recognition, or simply biometrics
[7]. A biometric system is essentially a pattern recogni-
tion application that makes use of biometric traits (e.g.,
fingerprints, iris, face or hand images) to automatically
recognize individuals.
After acquiring the biometric sample, these systems
extract the intrinsic information which is discriminant
and exclusive of that particular user. This information,
or feature vector, is stored in a biometric template which
is later used as a representation of the subject identity
and deployed for authentication purposes. The biomet-
ric template should be a compact and precise representa-
tion of the user identity (e.g., iriscode or minutiae points
of a fingerprint). Therefore, one of the key aspects of
the biometric recognition process to which great efforts
have been dedicated is the efficient “translation” of the
raw biometric sample into a stable, simple and highly
discriminant template.
However, over the last recent years important atten-
tion has also been paid to the opposite, and very chal-
lenging, reverse engineering problem: recovering the
original biometric sample from its parameterized tem-
plate. Such a reconstruction process has been generally
referred to as inverse biometrics [9], and, for a long pe-
riod of time it was believed to be unfeasible for certain
traits such as the fingerprints or the iris.
In this context, several methods have been proposed
for the reconstruction of face images [1], fingerprint im-
pressions [2], or irides [8]. The reconstructed samples
have been used for multiple applications such as vulner-
ability assessment, synthetically increasing the amount
of data available for a certain user, or as a possible solu-
tion for privacy-related issues.
However, in spite of its many potential uses, the re-
verse engineering of biometric templates still remains
unexplored for largely deployed traits such as the hand-
written signature or the hand. In the present contribu-
tion we address the inverse biometrics problem for the
hand geometry trait and propose the first reconstruction
approach to recover hand geometry samples from their
templates. The technique, which is based on a combi-
nation of the uphill-simplex algorithm and a synthetic
hand generator, clearly shows the feasibility of such an
inverse biometrics methodology. Furthermore, the pro-
posed approach is general in the sense that it does not
need to know the format of the template (i.e., what in-
formation is stored in it, or how it is stored).
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